Neuroethics: A Critique of the Reductionism of Cognitive Neuroscience in Ethics. The human psyche has long been a subject of fascination for philosophers from various perspectives. Many believed that humans possess two existential natures: the immaterial soul and the material body. In contrast, other philosophers asserted that only matter, or the body, exists. However, is it correct to approach this inquiry within such a framework? The reductionist model versus the dualist model? Or is there a better framework?

We propose that we are faced with two distinct models of the human being. The first model portrays the human as a person, a product of a specific inherited historical and cultural nature that is subject to gradual modification, but cannot emerge in a Darwinian sense from a lower animal; this nature justifies their specific behaviors. The second model views the human as a machine or a computer, a specific series of neural or brain processes, where behavior is easily explained as a result of these operations. The difference between the two models is vast. Most contemporary issues concerning free will, morality, and even religion stem from the modern preference for the second model. The objective of this book is to provide a descriptive affirmation of the first model and a refutation of the second.

• Author: Reda Zidan
• Publisher: Barahin Center for Research and Studies - London
• Year of Publication: 2018
• Pages: 128
• Parts: 1
• Binding: Paperback
• Paper Type: Standard
• ISBN: 9789776545359