Husserl defines his idealism as [phenomenological transcendentalism], an expression where each word gains its meaning only through its fundamental relationship with the others. Husserl is precise about its meaning, as it is a transcendental idealism, and he defines its specific difference as phenomenological. Thus, we understand why he pointed out that he did not intend his idealism to be a mere repetition of Kant's definitions, especially as they appeared in the [Fourth Paralogism] of the Critique of Pure Reason. Phenomenological idealism is not a theory concerning a specific sector of being, because for him, being is not divided into being-in-itself and being-for-us. Idealism, by its transcendental nature, must be a comprehensive theory of being. It is a theory of all existence founded on the principle of describing its constitution and interpretation. The model or fundamental aspect of idealism is determined by constitution; it is a constitutive idealism. Therefore, its problems are problems of constitution, based on the thesis that everything that exists is constituted in and for consciousness, and that any existence outside of consciousness is non-existence or meaningless.

• Author: Mohsen Al-Zarei
• Publishing house: Dar Al-Tanweer for Printing, Publishing, and Distribution
• Number of Pages: 328
• Year of publication: 2010